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Abstract. Choosing actions within norm-regulated environments in-
volves balancing achieving one’s goals and coping with any penalties
for non-compliant behaviour. This choice becomes more complicated in
environments where there is uncertainty. In this paper, we address the
question of choosing actions in environments where there is uncertainty
regarding both the outcomes of agent actions and the intensity of mon-
itoring for norm violations. Our technique assumes no prior knowledge
of probabilities over action outcomes or the likelihood of norm violations
being detected by employing reinforcement learning to discover both
the dynamics of the environment and the effectiveness of the enforcer.
Results indicate agents become aware of greater rewards for violations
when enforcement is lax, which gradually become less attractive as the
enforcement is increased.
1 Introduction
Norm-driven behaviour and monitoring have traditionally make four assump-
tions about the enforcement mechanism and the environment in which agents
act, namely:
– the environment is fully deterministic (e.g. [11, 21, 13]);
– enforcement is either perfect or limited in known ways (e.g. “coverage” is
limited [1]);
– agents are perfectly aware of all information regarding the environment and
monitoring;
– agents do not change their behaviour due to changes in enforcement capa-
bility [8].
2While settings based on these assumptions are a useful abstraction for theoretical
work on norm-driven behaviour, when norm-driven agents are meant to either
model or mimic rational decision-making behaviour in realistic environments,
such as in agent-based simulation [3], they must either be relaxed or dropped
entirely [12]. Consider the following example. An agent driving a car enters a
city in a foreign city,4 which has streets and traffic dynamics that are known to
the agent, and the agent has a goal to drop off a passenger as close as possible
to the passenger’s desired destination. The agent is unaware of the meaning of
the signs in this city and of the frequency with which traffic wardens patrol the
streets, and must make a decision as to where to drop off the passenger, knowing
that traffic may force it to stop at undesirable locations. In this kind of situation,
existing approaches to norm reasoning fail to provide the agent with the means
to make a decision due to a number of factors. First, although the agent is aware
of the optimal way of dropping off the passenger from a movement point of view,
it is unaware of exactly which spots are forbidden, and, if so, whether a sanction
will be immediately applied. Second, the environment is stochastic, and some
movements of the agent may be sanctioned because the environment forced the
agent (by chance) to be at a certain spot. Third, if the agent makes a decision
and is not sanctioned, nothing guarantees that sanctions may not be applied in
the future.
In this paper, we use a reinforcement learning-based mechanism to learn
normative rewards, and investigate norm enforcement mechanisms to regulate
such reinforcement learning agents. Our mechanism assumes no prior knowledge
of the normative state or enforcement intensity, and yields policies that are
close to optimal using multiple reinforcement-learning techniques. We show the
effectiveness of our approach empirically via simulations and identify key learning
algorithm and parameter combinations for our scenario. The ultimate aim of our
work is to allow enforcement agents to improve enforcement over time.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. We formalise the problem
we aim to solve with our approach in Section 2 and proceed to describe our
approach in Section 3, which we validate empirically using the experiments in
Section 4. Finally, we compare our approach to related work in Section 5 and
conclude the paper with a discussion of our contributions and directions for
future work in Section 6.
2 Problem Formalisation
Norms have been widely advocated as a means of coordinating multi-agent sys-
tems and several approaches have been proposed in the literature, including
state-based norms (where norms are defined in terms of states that should or
should not occur), e.g., [10], and event-based norms (where norms are defined in
terms of what agents should or should not do), e.g., [6, 4]. Similarly, various ap-
proaches to the implementation of norms have been proposed, including enforce-
4 A city foreign to the agent’s designer.
3ment (where sanctions are imposed on norm-violating states and behaviours) and
regimentation (where norm-violating states and behaviours are eliminated).
2.1 Norms and Enforcement
In this paper, we adopt essentially a state-based approach to norms and as-
sume norms are regulated using enforcement. Each state of the environment is
described in terms of a set of features {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}, where each feature corre-
sponds to a binary variable that must be either true or false (i.e. each feature is
a propositional variable). Thus, the combination of all features (i.e. the enumer-
ation of all possible models of ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) induces a state-space S.Using such
features, we define an entailment relation |= over states and formulas using the
standard logic connectives (∧, ∨, ¬,→), so that (s ∈ S) |= ϕ means that the set
of features present in s is a model of ϕ.
Norms specify conditions (sets of states) that either must hold (obligation) or
should not hold (prohibition) when a triggering or activation condition is true.
For example, parking in a no-parking zone may be prohibited between 8am and
6pm. If a norm is violated, a penalty or sanction is applied in the violation state,
e.g., parking illegally may result in a fine of $100. This has some similarities to the
use of ‘counts as’ rules in normative multi-agent programming, e.g., [5]. However
we feel our approach is more intuitive in allowing the direct representation of
obligation deontic modalities, rather than simply violations as in [5].
Definition 1. A norm is a tuple 〈δ,G,φ,ψ, ρ〉 where:
– δ ∈ {obligation, prohibition} is the deontic modality;
– G is a set of agent roles to which the norm applies;
– φ is the activation condition, which induces a set of states Sφ such that
Sφ = {s | s ∈ S ∧ s |= φ};
– ψ is the normative condition, which induces a set of states Sψ such that
Sψ = {s | s ∈ Sφ ∧ s |= ψ};
– ρ : S → R is a function that specifies the penalty for violating the norm in a
given state ( ρ(s) returns the penalty to be paid in s).
A norm n = 〈δ,G,φ,ψ, ρ〉 is activated in a state s ∈ Sφ, i.e., a state in which
the activation condition φ of the norm holds for an agent a if the role of the agent
role(a) is a role to which the norm applies, role(a) ∈ G. The norm is obeyed if the
normative condition ψ holds in s (in the case of obligations) or does not hold in
s (in the case of prohibitions). Otherwise the norm is violated in s, and the agent
must pay a penalty ρ(s) in s. We assume that agents are self interested, and only
comply with norms if the expected penalties for non-compliance outweigh the
benefits of violating a norm from the agent’s perspective.
2.2 Monitoring Compliance
Norms are monitored and enforced by a normative organisation. The normative
organisation is responsible for: determining when a norm is activated in a state,
4whether an activated norm is obeyed or violated, and (in the case of violations),
for applying the appropriate penalty.
A normative organisation monitors a set of norms N , and (c.f. Definition 1)
a state s ∈ S violates a norm n = 〈δ,G,φ,ψ, ρ〉 ∈ N if δ = prohibition and
s |= ψ, or δ = obligation and s 6|= ψ. The set N−s of norms violated in state s is
defined as
N−s = {〈δ,G,φ,ψ, ρ〉 ∈ N | δ = prohibition ∧ s |= ψ} ∪
{〈δ,G,φ,ψ, ρ〉 ∈ N | δ = obligation ∧ s 6|= ψ}
We assume that the probability that violations of a norm will be detected is
under the control of the normative organisation. The enforcement intensity of
the norm is a measure of the ‘effort’ the normative organisation is prepared to
invest in detecting violations of the norm. An enforcement intensity of 1 indicates
violations will be detected with probability 1, while an enforcement intensity of
0 indicates that the norm is not enforced (no violations are detected).
The enforcement intensity is modelled as a detection function D(n, t), which
gives the detection probability of the violation of the norm n ∈ N at time step
t.5 In Fagundes [7], the detection function takes into account the current state,
that is, D(n, s) where n ∈ N and s ∈ S, but ignores the fact that in some
systems the detection probabilities are not constant since they can be changed
over time as part of a norm enforcement strategy.
Note that, as part of its norm enforcement strategy, a normative organisa-
tion may choose not to disclose the current enforcement intensity to the agents.
This disparity in information regarding the enforcement intensity was termed
information asymmetry in [12]. In this case, agents must determine the like-
lihood of norm violations being detected either by assuming the enforcement
intensity to be some constant, or by trying to learn it. Criticially, given that
agents cannot learn the enforcement intensity perfectly or even approximate the
actual intensity without a temporal delay to observe sufficient instances of norm
enforcement, it becomes possible for the normative organisation to optimise the
effort spent monitoring to achieve a given level of compliance.
In the remainder of the paper we investigate norm enforcement mechanisms
to regulate the behaviour of self-interested rational agents in a fully-observable
stochastic environment. The mechanisms take into account not only the imme-
diate costs and benefits of enforcing the norms with a given intensity, but also
information asymmetry, and the adaptive capabilities of the agents which can
change their behaviour in response to perceived changes in the norm enforcement
intensity.
2.3 Example
In this section we introduce a simple Parking World scenario to illustrate the
idea of variable enforcement of a norm. In the scenario, an agent drives from a
5 In a slight abuse of notation, we shall denote by D(n) the detection probability of
the violation of the norm n ∈ N where n is constant at all time points t
5start location to a destination location (e.g., from work to home). The agent can
stop on the way (e.g., to buy groceries on the way home). There are two places
the agent can park: a legal parking zone, which has lower utility, but does not
violate a parking norm, and an illegal parking zone, which violates the parking
norm, but may have higher utility. If the violation is undetected (the parking
norm is not enforced), the utility of parking illegally is higher than of parking
legally; however if the norm if enforced the agent incurs a large sanction.
The Parking World is shown in Figure 1, and consists of a 5× 5 grid of cells.
The environment contains four distinguished cells: the START cell (1, 1), the
END cell (5, 5), a “legal parking cell” (2, 4) and an “illegal parking cell” (4, 2).
The agent enters the environment at the START cell and can move from cell to
cell orthogonally and may revisit each cell apart from the END cell an arbitrary
number of times. When the agent reaches the END cell the simulation stops.
Visiting a parking cell counts as parking, and we assume that the agent parks
at most once (legally or illegally) en route. The reward structure if the agent
has not already parked is shown in Figure 1a. When visiting all cells except
the END cell and the parking cells, the agent receives a small negative reward
(penalty) of -4 (i.e., short routes between START and END have higher utility).
Visiting the legal parking cell (2, 4) has a positive utility of +20. The reward
for visiting the illegal parking cell (4, 2) depends on whether the normative
organisation enforces the parking norm. If the norm is not enforced, the agent
receives a positive reward of +50; if the norm is enforced, the agent receives
a large negative reward -100 (i.e., a sanction). Visiting the END results in a
reward of +100. The reward structure after the agent has parked at least once
is shown in Figure 1b. In this case, visiting all cells except the END cell results
in a small negative reward (penalty) of -4, and visiting the END results in a
reward of +100. After the agent has parked once, the parking cells effectively
become ‘normal’ cells and the parking norm is no longer enforced on the illegal
parking cell (4, 2).
The scenario is designed such that the agent has to make a single decision
about where to park on its way home (parking repeatedly does not increase the
agent’s utility). Parking legally gives a positive reward. The reward for visiting
the illegal parking cell is controlled by the normative organisation. Specifically,
the probability that the agent will receive a negative rather than a positive
reward for parking illegally is determined by the enforcement intensity. Critically,
the agent has limited information about the enforcement intensity of the parking
norm. However the agent can attempt to learn the enforcement intensity over
multiple trials, and we discuss this in the next section.
3 Reinforcement Learning in Normative Organisations
The process of reinforcement learning (RL) can be described as follows: an RL
agent first obtains the initial state of the environment and then selects and
executes an action. The environment then responds with a numerical reward and
a new state. The agent makes its second move based on the reward it received
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Fig. 1: Two Layer Parking World
in the first step and the new state. This process repeats until the agent reaches
the end state or it cannot proceed any further. For example,
s0
a0 r1−−−−−−→ s1 a1 r2−−−−−−→ s2 ... sn−1 an−1 rn−−−−−−−−→ sn
where sn is state n, an is an action made by agent at state n, rn+1 = R(sn+1)
is the reward given by the environment for reaching state n+ 1.
RL can be formulated as Markov Decision Process (MDP). An MDP is a
five-tuple, MDP =< S,A, P (s′|s, a), R >, where
– S is a set of possible states. For all states in discrete time steps, st ∈ S.
– A is a set of possible actions, where for all actions a possible in a given state,
a ∈ A.
– P (s′|s, a) is the probability of moving from state s to s′ when executing
action a, such that
∑
s′ P (s
′|s, a) = 1 and P (s′|s, a) ≥ 0.
– R is the reward function, mapping from states to reward values. R : S 7→ R.
– γ is the discount factor, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. The discount factor determines the
importance of future rewards.
The goal of agent is to maximise its total reward, Σni=0R(si), by computing
a control policy. The policy is a function, pi, that maps from each possible state
of the environment to an action.
pi : S → A
The optimal policy is obtained by learning a value function, V , that maps each
state (or state-action pair for Q-learning) to a numeric value, indicating expected
total reward following that state. The optimal value function, V ∗, is defined as
V ∗(s) = R(s) + max
a∈A
γ
∑
s′∈S
P (s′|s, a)V ∗(s′)
7Therefore, the optimal policy, pi∗, can be defined as the best action a such that
future expected total reward is maximised in state s.
pi∗(s) = arg max
a∈A
∑
s′∈S
P (s′|s, a)V ∗(s′)
We assume that the agents do not know exactly what the rewards are for states
where norms apply, nor exactly which states are affected by norms (and thus,
the probability of being sanctioned). We have therefore developed an approach
that can use any model-free reinforcement learning mechanism, and have im-
plemented the two most common reinforcement learning algorithms, namely
SARSA [15] and Q-Learning [20].
A key problem in RL, is balancing exploration and exploitation. For each step,
the agent needs to decide whether to follow the best action given by its learned
policy (exploitation) or randomly pick an action (exploration). It’s obvious that
we cannot do exploration all the time, which means that agent makes no use of
the learned knowledge about the environment. On the other hand, exploitation
fails to discover potential better actions. In our approach, we use an epsilon-
greedy strategy, which chooses an exploitation action in most cases; however
with probability , the agent chooses a random action. This guarantees that
eventually all states are visited after an infinite number of runs. If a∗ is the
optimal action given by agent’s policy, the probability of choosing an action
a ∈ A using an epsilon-greedy strategy is:
P (a)←
{
1− + |A| , if a = a∗

|A| , if a 6= a∗
In practice,  should be large enough to help the agent interact with the envi-
ronment and learn quickly, and small enough to maximise the total rewards. A
value of 0.1 is often used in the literature.
The basic reinforcement learning algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. Each
trial t represents a full execution of the agent starting from the initial state to
the end state. The current state s and the next state s′ are initialised to the
initial state s0. For each step in a trial, if the agent is not already in the end
state, we calculate all applicable states of the agent given its current state. The
exploration-exploitation strategy then decides whether the agent chooses explo-
ration (selects a random action), or exploitation (an action given by agent’s
policy). The next state s′ is given by executing the action in a non-deterministic
environment. The optimal next state s∗ is the state followed by agent’s policy
without consideration of environment (Algorithm 3). The mechanism of assign-
ing the reward of each step r is given Section 2.3 and in detail in Algorithm
2. Finally, we update the utilities of states (or state-action pairs) using either
SARSA or Q-learning algorithms (Algorithms 4 and 5) (depending on the ex-
perimental setup, see Section 4).
SARSA and Q-Learning are temporal difference approaches to learning the
optimal policy. The core of the two algorithms are update equations for the
8Algorithm 1: Reinforcement learning for the Parking World
1 foreach t ∈ totalTrials do
2 s← s′ ← s0
3 while ¬isTerminal(s) do
4 A← applicableActions(s)
5 if isExploration(t) then
6 a← random a ∈ A
7 else
8 a← pi(s)
9 s′ ← execute(a)
10 s∗ ← getOptimalState(s)
11 r ← getReward(s)
12 V (s)← Update(s, s′, s∗, α, γ)
13 s← s′
/* Update final state */
14 r ← getReward(s)
15 err ← r + 0− V (s)
16 V (s)← V (s) + α ∗ err
17 reset
Algorithm 2: getReward(state)
1 if s = illegalState then
2 if isDetected(s) then
3 r ← penaltyOfIllegalParking;
4 else
5 r ← R(s);
/* Once the illegal cell or the legal cell is visited, they become
’normal’ cells and norms are not enforced */
6 if s = illegalState or s = legalState then
7 illegalState.reward← defaultReward;
8 legalState.reward← defaultReward;
9 enforcementIntensity ← 0
10 return r
Algorithm 3: getOptimalState(state)
1 foreach a ∈ applicableAction(s) do
2 s′ ← execute(a);
3 if V (s′) > V (s∗) then
4 s∗ ← s′
5 return s∗
9value function, which are given in Algorithm 4 (for SARSA) and Algorithm 5
for (Q-learning). α is the learning rate that controls the amount of difference
that contributes to the update of the value of state s.
Algorithm 4: SARSA: Update(s, s’, s∗, α, γ)
1 return V (s) + α · [r + γ · V (s′)− V (s)]
Algorithm 5: Q-learning: Update(s, s’, s∗, α, γ)
1 return V (s) + α · [r + γ · V (s∗)− V (s)]
The SARSA and Q-learning algorithms have distinct characteristics [16, p.
844] when exploration takes place. In this context, Q-learning is more flexible in
the sense that it is able to converge towards an optimal policy even if the initial
policy is random or very low quality, since its update rule always takes the best
Q-value backed up so far. Conversely, SARSA is more realistic in that its update
rule always uses the actual values obtained in each learning episode (and thus
has less bias towards optimistic assessments). This has important implications
for the results we might expect from these algorithms in our approach. Namely,
we expect Q-learning to perform better when the penalties for violation are
high, resulting in a norm-compliant policy substantially different than a norm-
ignoring policy, whereas we expect SARSA to perform better when the enforcer
agent changes enforcement more often.
4 Experiments
We carried out two experiments using the scenario described in Section 2 to
study the behaviour of the SARSA and Q-learning agents:
1. under different fixed enforcement intensities; and
2. under variable enforcement intensities.
In both experiments, we used the following parameter values (the meanings are
explained Section 3):
– the -greedy strategy has  = 0.1;
– the discount factor, γ, is set to 0.9; and
– the learning rate, α, is set to 0.01 for the first 100,100 trials to help the
agents learn efficiently in the earlier trials.
10
α←
{
1
c−100000 , if c ≥ 100, 100
0.01, if c < 100, 100
(1)
where c is the number of times that a cell has been visited.
4.1 Fixed Enforcement Intensities
We know that if the enforcement intensity is high, choosing a path that goes
through the legal parking cell gives a higher total reward. On the other hand,
choosing a path through the illegal cell is better if the enforcement intensity is
low. Therefore, there exists a critical value of enforcement intensity where the
agent switches its preference from a path through the legal cell to a path through
the illegal cell or vice versa. The purpose of the first experiment is to find this
critical value.
In the first experiment, we varied the enforcement intensity from 0 to 1 in
steps of 0.1. Having identified the critical range of values, we performed a further
set of experiments using a step size of 0.01. For each experiment the agent was
run 10 times with 1 million episodes per run to obtain an average utility.
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Fig. 2: Learned utilities for differing enforcement intensity (SARSA)
The results for the SARSA agent are shown in Figure 2. As can be seen, the
critical enforcement intensity is around 0.22. Moreover, Figure 2 shows that when
the enforcement intensity is greater than 0.3, further increases in enforcement
intensity have no significant effect on the utility of the legal cell. Similarly, when
the intensity is below 0.18, decreasing the enforcement intensity has very little
effect on the utility of illegal cell.
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Fig. 3: Learned utilities for differing enforcement intensity (Q-learning)
The results for the Q-learning agent are shown in Figure 3. In this case,
the utilities of the legal and illegal cells are very close when the enforcement
intensity is lower than 0.15. While the utility of the legal cell is stable when the
enforcement intensity increases, the utility of the illegal cell decreases.
4.2 Variable Enforcement Intensities
The second experiment was designed to show how the SARSA and Q-learning
agents behave when the enforcement intensity changes during a single run. This
experiment was divided into two phases. In the first phase, the agent was trained
with an enforcement intensity of 0 until its learned utilities for the legal and
illegal cells converged. The agent was then evaluated 1,000 times using this
learned policy (the policy was kept fixed during the evaluation period). The agent
then entered the second phase with the policy it learned in the first phase. In
this phase, the enforcement intensity was changed to 1 and the agent was trained
1,000 times followed by 1,000 runs for evaluation (again the policy learned in
the second phase was kept fixed during the evaluation period). We ran this
experiment 10 times and took the average total reward of each episode. Since
the length of the training period in the first phase varied from run to run, we
do not report the data collected in this period in our results.
The total rewards for the first 1,000 runs collected during the evaluation of
the SARSA agent trained under an enforcement intensity 0 are shown in Figure
4. In this period, the agent chooses the illegal path as no sanctions are applied,
resulting very high total rewards (about 110 on average). At the 1,001st episode,
the intensity changes to 1, resulting in all illegal parking being punished. As a
consequence, the total reward drops immediately, because the agent continues
12
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Fig. 4: Total rewards received by the SARSA agent for enforcement intensities 0
and 1. The green dots are the average total reward of 10 runs and the red dots
are the averages of 100 recent green dots.
to follow a policy that believes an illegal path is better, which is no longer
correct. However, the SARSA agent is able to adapt to this change very quickly.
After a few episodes with very low total rewards, its policy is updated to a legal
path. As we can see from the figure, the average total rewards after the change
in enforcement intensity is about 80. In addition to this main result, we also
observe that the average total reward of an illegal path is 30 units higher than
an legal one. This is expected and is exactly what we defined in the scenario,
where the rewards of the legal cell and illegal cell are 20 and 50 respectively.
However, the results of the first evaluation period for the Q-learning agent
(first 1,000 episodes in Figure 5) fluctuate, as it has difficulty deciding between a
legal path or an illegal one, i.e., the utilities of legal and illegal parking cells are
very close when the enforcement intensity is 0. When the intensity is increased
to 1 after the first 1,000 episodes, the agent also quickly learned a new policy
which gives similar total rewards as the SARSA agent. At the moment we are
investigating the causes of this behaviour, and our future work aims to use
different scenarios to replicate it and hopefully explain under what conditions
this shift in utility happens.
5 Related Work
Our work builds upon the basic model of Fagundes et al. [9]. While the NMDPs
in that work are slightly more expressive in allowing penalties in the form of
enforced transitions, the basic assumption of constant enforcement intensity
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Fig. 5: Total rewards received by Q agent under different enforcement intensity.
The green dots are the average total reward of 10 runs and the red dots are the
averages of 100 recent green dots.
throughout an agent’s lifetime in [9] precludes the kind of learning mechanism
and normative organisation adaptation we define in this paper.
Our work is also related to work on norm identification. Norm identification
techniques have mostly been developed in deterministic environments, with a fo-
cus on identifying the actual norms present in a normative MAS rather than in
detecting the enforcement intensity of the norms [17]. Savarimuthu et al. [18, 19]
propose learning-based norm identification mechanisms to identify conditional
norms. This work differs from ours in two fundamental respects: first, it assumes
the norms are not known (and the task is discovering them and their conditions),
and second, the environment is deterministic. In addition, their use of learning
techniques focuses on data-mining techniques to be used in environment interac-
tion histories, whereas our work is based on the use of reinforcement learning by
an agent acting in the environment. Thus, whereas Savarimuthu’s agents learn
norms by observation, ours learn the enforcement intensity of (known) norms by
acting on the environment.
Morales at al. [14] have proposed a mechanism for the automated synthesis
of norms that ensures norms are conflict free and achieve certain coordination
properties. In contrast, we assume the set of norms is static, and the synthesis
approach proposed by Morales et al. does not consider the possibility of im-
perfect or variable enforcement. We believe the combination of norm synthesis
approaches and a variable enforcement mechanism are a promising avenue of
future work.
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6 Conclusion
Our experiments show that reinforcement learning agents can: 1) learn different
policies to maximise their total rewards under different unknown norm enforce-
ment intensities in a non-deterministic environment; and 2) adapt to a change of
enforcement intensity very quickly so as to obtain maximum total reward under
the new enforcement intensity.
There are several directions for future work. The behaviour of the Q-learning
agent under low enforcement intensities requires further investigation to explain
why the agent is unable to choose between the legal and illegal parking cells. In
addition, we would like to include enforced transitions in our learning framework,
e.g., instead of a penalty after violation, the agent is returned to the initial state.
Finally, we plan to explore the behaviour of the normative organisation, i.e., how
the normative organisation can maximise its utility by changing enforcement
intensities given the agent’s policies.
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